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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
S. W. 740 (1905). Thus where the debtor has been lulled into a
feeling of false security by the statements of the defendant, the lat-
ter is estopped from setting up the statute of frauds because the
instrument was not in writing. Combs v. Little, 4 N. J. Eq. 310
(1843), 40 Am. Dec. 207. In view of the strict scrutiny of this class
of case by the New York courts, it is doubtful whether the instant
holding would he supported in New York. But it is clearly estab-
lished in this jurisdiction that where the parties stand in close con-
fidential relations, an abuse of confidence produced by fraud will
move a court of equity to grant relief. Wood v. Rabe, 96 N. Y. 414
(1884); Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 145 N. Y. 313, 318, 39 N. E. 1067
(1895) ; Leary v. Corvin, 181 N. Y. 222, 228, 73 N. E. 984 (1905).
CRIMINAL LAw-LARcENY.-The defendant was the tenant of an
apartment under a lease, the term of which had expired, but the right
of occupation and possession continued under statute. He inserted an
ad in a newspaper offering to sub-rent by month or year. The com-
plaining witness answered the ad and paid the defendant a sum which
represented the agreed rental, but did not receive possession either on the
day when the contract was made or any other time. The defendant
continued to run the ad. The indictment contained two counts. The
first charged obtaining money tinder false pretenses and the second
with larceny by trick and device. The first count was dismissed and the
defendant was found guilty on the second. Held, that the evidence
was insufficient to support the indictment charging larceny by trick
and device. Judgment reversed and indictment dismissed, two judges
dissenting. People v. Noblett, 244 N. Y. 355 (1927).
For a discussion of the principles involved see supra, page 176.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-The action was brought to test the con-
stitutionality of sec. 167-174 of the General Business Law of New
York which forbade the resale of theatre tickets at an advance of
more than 50 cents above the printed price. The case was heard by
a special Constitutional Court below and the decree dismissing the bill
was brought to the Supreme Court for review. Held, the act is uncon-
stitutional in that it deprived the plaintiff of property without due
process of law. Decree reversed and injunction granted. Tyson z'.
Banton, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (U. S. 1927).
In this case the Supreme Court holds unconstitutional a statute
of the State of New York fixing the resale price of theatre tickets
by so called brokers to fifty cents above the price printed on the ticket.
Other features of this. statute had already been upheld by the court.
See Weller v. New York, 268 U. S. 319 (1926). It follows that the
only difficulty with the statute was that it attempted to fix prices.
This the majority said can not be done in an industry not affected with
a public interest. The majority reaffirm Lord Hale's proposition con-
cerning industries affected with a public use but leaves wide open the
discovery of a method of ascertaining which industries can beincluded
under that head. It must appear therefore that the ultimate solution
to the problem is to be found by the judicial method of inclusion and
exclusion. The dissenting judges divide into three classes. Mr. Justice
Stone points out that the statute does not necessarily fix prices but can
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be interpreted as a condition attached to the license of the theatre
ticket brokers. Mr. Justice Sanford does not see how the fourteenth
amendment is in the way of the constitutionality of this statute. Mr.justice Holmes with whom Mr. Justice Brandeis concurs feels that
the entire distinction between industries affected with a public interest
and industries not so affected is meaningless and that the real distinc-
tion is between regulations with and regulations without compensation.
INJUNcTIONS-STRIKES IN INTERSTATE COMMIERCE-The defendant
is a national association, divided into a number of locals. The plain-
tiffs for a number of years worked under agreements with the general
union. Because of certain demands, these agreements were not renewed
and the plaintiffs organized a union of their own. The defendants
then issued an order, by virtue of their constitution, whereby no member
of the association shall cut, carve or fit any material that has been cut
by men working in opposition to the association. The plaintiffs seek
to have the enforcement of this provision restrained. The case was
dismissed in the lower court and comes up on appeal. Held, the order
is in violation of the Anti-Trust Act inasmuch as it restrains interstate
commerce. Judgment reversed and injunction granted. Bedford Cut
Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Asso. of North America. U. S.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 1, 1926, No 412, 71 L. Ed. 581 (1927).
For a discussion of the principles involved see supra, page 189.
BANKS AND BANKING-PRINCnAL AND AGET-Plaintiff gave a
power of attorney to his son to make, sign, indorse, deposit, draw
and deliver checks and other orders for the payment of money on
two New York City banks. The son, prior to the issuance of this
power of attorney, had an individual account with one of the banks.
the defendant in the action. Shortly after the issuance of the power,
the son began to draw a series of 21 checks, either payable to
his own order or to that of the defendant, signed "C. H. Cohan by
C. H. Cohan, Jr., his Attorney." Each of these checks were de-
posited in the personal account and to the credit of the agent. All
but two checks had been certified by the drawee bank before deposit.
More than a year after the last of the series had been drawn, de-
posited and paid, plaintiff ascertained of the withdrawals from his
account and of the crediting of the same to his agent's (son) ac-
count. The checks had been expended for purposes unknown and
not beneficial to the plaintiff. Held, that the plaintiff was able to
recover inasmuch as the defendant bank was charged with notice
by the form and face of the instruments themselves as to the purpose
for which the agent was drawing the checks, and where a bank of
deposit permits a depositor to unlawfully apply the funds of an-
other if it has notice which would lead a reasonable man to suspect
wrong, and facts to either verify or dispel that suspicion, it is re-
sponsible for the consequences of its act. Judgment affirmed. Cahan
v. Empire Trust Co.. 9 Fed. (2d) 713 (C. C. A. 2d. 1926).
The rule enunciated above, if an agent's bank receives for de-
posit, to the personal account of the agent, checks drawn by the
agent to his own order on the principal's fund, that bank is, by the
checks themselves, charged with notice that the agent is wrongfully
